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DECONSTRUCTING THE MATERNAL WALL: STRATEGIES FOR 
VINDICATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF “CARERS”1 IN THE WORKPLACE 
JOAN C. WILLIAMS AND ELIZABETH S. WESTFALL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the glass ceiling and sexual harassment continue to pose formidable 
obstacles to women’s advancement in the workplace, many women are also 
harmed by another form of gender discrimination known as the “maternal 
wall.” 2  Women run up against the maternal wall when they are discriminated 
against in the workplace because of past, present or future pregnancies or 
because they have taken one or more maternity leaves.  Women also may 
experience discrimination when they adopt part-time or flexible work schedules. 
In recent years, women have increasingly sought legal relief to remedy 
discrimination related to the maternal wall.  In 1992, women filed 3,385 charges 
of pregnancy discrimination, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,3 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and state and 
local Fair Employment Practices Agencies, and by 2004 that number had 
increased by nearly forty percent to 4,512.4  In 1992, the total monetary benefits 
recovered as a result of the filing of these charges, excluding monetary benefits 
obtained through litigation, nearly tripled from $3.7 million in 1992 to $11.3 
million in 2004.5 
Likewise, complaints filed with the U.S. Department of Labor concerning 
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)6 are on the rise.  Administrative 
complaints to the U.S. Department of Labor increased by twenty percent in the 
 
 1. We adopt this term from Australia to refer to adults with family care-giving responsibilities.  
See generally Juliet Bourke, Using the Law to Support Work/Life Issues: The Australian Experience, 12 AM. 
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 19 (2004). 
 * Elizabeth S. Westfall is a Senior Attorney with Advancement Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 
Carleton College (1990); J.D. Harvard Law School (1996).  Joan C. Williams is a Distinguished 
Professor of Law and Founding Director of The Center for WorkLife Law, University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law. 
 2. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers 
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Williams, 
Beyond the Maternal Wall]. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
 4. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION CHARGES 
EEOC & FEPAS COMBINED: FY 1992-FY 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/pregnanc.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
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past three years from 2,790 in 2001 to 3,350 in 2004.7  Of those complaints, the 
majority involved employees who asserted that they were terminated after they 
sought FMLA leave.8 
In addition to filing complaints with administrative agencies, women who 
have experienced maternal wall discrimination are increasingly seeking to 
vindicate their civil rights through litigation.  One recent study of FMLA 
litigation identified 140 written opinions issued between 1995 and 2003 
concerning childbirth or adoption leave.9  Termination of employees after FMLA 
leave was the primary reason that employees filed a complaint (32% of 
complaints).  Employer refusal to restore the employee to an equivalent position 
after leave had ended produced the second highest number of complaints (23% 
of complaints), followed closely by the denial of FMLA leave (22% of 
complaints), and termination as the result of requesting leave (18% of 
complaints).10 
With many cases being brought pursuant to the FMLA, as well as Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)11 and the Equal Pay Act,12 a substantial body of 
case law has developed in which plaintiffs have prevailed.  These cases reveal 
that, notwithstanding widespread criticisms of these civil rights laws, many 
mothers—and others who have been discriminated against because of their care-
giving responsibilities—are suing, and courts are often finding in their favor. 
This article is the product of collaboration between a seasoned civil rights 
litigator, Elizabeth Westfall, and the director of the Center for WorkLife Law at 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Joan Williams.  WorkLife 
Law is dedicated to decreasing the economic vulnerability of “carers” by 
working with all sides—employers and employees,13 plaintiffs’14 and 
management-side employment attorneys,15 as well as unions,16 and the press.17 
 
 7. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2004 
STATISTICS FACT SHEET, http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200411.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 
2005). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Maternity Leave Under the FMLA: An Analysis of the 
Litigation Experience, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 143, 153-54 (2004). 
 10. Id. at 157-58. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2000). 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). 
 13. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY 
RETENTION, BETTER ON BALANCE? THE CORPORATE COUNSEL WORK/LIFE REPORT (2003), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/betteronbalance.pdf; JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA 
THOMAS CALVERT, THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY RETENTION, BALANCED HOURS: EFFECTIVE PART-TIME 
POLICIES FOR WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/ 
site_files/WLL/BalancedHours2nd.pdf.  For further information about The Project for Attorney 
Retention, see http://www.pardc.org/. 
 14. See JOAN WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, WORKLIFE LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY 
CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION (forthcoming). 
 15. WORKLIFE LAW, MITIGATING RISK: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE LAW (forthcoming 
2006). 
 16. See MARTIN H. MALIN, MAUREEN K. MILLIGAN, MARY C. STILL, & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 
WORKLIFE LAW, WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT, UNION STYLE: LABOR ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING FAMILY 
CARE (2004), available at  http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/conflictunionstyle.pdf. 
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This article examines some of the recent, groundbreaking case law from the 
perspective of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers.  Part II of this Article discusses 
the impact of recent case law on the development of maternal wall 
jurisprudence.  Part III discusses where courts have narrowly construed the civil 
rights statutes under which plaintiffs have brought their claims or imposed 
other barriers to obtaining relief, and suggests strategies plaintiffs’ lawyers can 
use to overcome these hurdles and redevelop the case law.  Finally, Part IV 
explores the potential of existing statutes to challenge the legality of specific 
practices—such as the requirement that employees conduct all work in the office 
and during particularized hours—that unfairly disadvantage many carers. 
II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MATERNAL WALL CASE LAW AND THEIR POTENTIAL 
TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS FOR CARERS 
In the past several years, a number of significant decisions have enlarged 
the class of plaintiffs protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and offered 
victims of maternal wall discrimination greater latitude in proving their claims 
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Equal Pay Act.  These cases are 
also noteworthy because they are consistent with social science research in 
recognizing that discrimination against mothers is often rooted in negative 
stereotypes about pregnant women and mothers. 
This Part discusses recent case law that increases the scope of the protected 
class under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include women who may 
become pregnant in the future and establishes that under certain circumstances, 
part-time workers may properly compare themselves to full-time workers.  This 
Part also discusses case law that makes clear that stereotyping about the 
qualities of mothers constitutes gender discrimination and that cases brought 
pursuant to this theory need not present comparative evidence of the 
employer’s treatment of fathers.  Finally, this Part analyzes the implications of 
these cases for future litigation of maternal wall cases. 
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act Prohibits Discrimination Based on Future 
Pregnancies and the Potential to Become Pregnant. 
Two federal appellate courts, the Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, recently held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act applies to future 
pregnancies, broadly defined.18  In Kocak v. Community Health Partners of Ohio, 
 
 17. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Envisioning a Career Path With Pit Stops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 10, 
at 1; Rebecca R. Kahlenberg, Dad-Friendly Benefits Must Be Nurtured; Corporate Culture, Not Official 
Policy, Still Governs at Work, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at K01; Colleen O’Connor, Moms of the 
World, Unite! A New Generation of Mothers is Seeking a Voice, DENVER POST, May 3, 2005, at F01; Joan 
C. Williams & Ariane Hegewisch, Op-Ed, All Work and No Play Is the U.S. Way, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2004, at B9; Emily Yellin, What Larry Summers Got Right; Many Women do Resist the 80-hour Workweek. 
The Problem Is Men Who Don’t, TIME, Feb. 28, 2005, at 76. 
 18. Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2005); Walsh v. Nat’l 
Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003); accord Newman v. Deer Path Inn, No. 98 C 7698, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1999); Jolley v. Phillips Educ. Group of Cent. 
Florida, Inc., Case No. 95-147-CIV-ORL-22, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19832, at *14 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 
1996); Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Ore. 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel 
Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401-02 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
03_WILLIAMS_WESTFALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:54 AM 
34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:31 2006 
Inc., Suzanne Kocak alleged that her former employer, Community Health 
Partners of Ohio, had rejected her application for reemployment due to 
complications in scheduling caused by her earlier pregnancy.19  The district court 
held that Ms. Kocak was not protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
because she had not been pregnant nor had she had any medical conditions 
related to pregnancy during her employer’s consideration of her application for 
reemployment.20 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that this was an error, relying upon the 
Supreme Court’s holding in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,21 
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against a woman “because of her capacity to become pregnant.”22  
Additionally, the court clarified that if a plaintiff chooses to prove her case with 
circumstantial evidence, she may satisfy the first prong of her prima facie case 
by demonstrating that she “was pregnant at some point in time (and not 
necessarily at the time of the adverse employment action complained of).” 23  
Moreover, the court did not rule out that a woman who had never before been 
pregnant could bring a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act under the 
theory that her employer discriminated against her because she could 
potentially become pregnant in the future.24 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc., 
rejected National Computer Systems’ argument that the judgment in favor of 
Shirleen Walsh on her Title VII claim should be set aside because Ms. Walsh had 
proceeded under a theory of parent or carer discrimination, which is not 
covered by Title VII.25  Instead, it held that Ms. Walsh’s assertion that she was 
discriminated against “not because she was a new parent, but because she is a 
woman who had been pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become 
pregnant again,” was a viable claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.26  
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit declined to disturb the jury verdict in favor of 
Ms. Walsh’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim on the ground that Ms. Walsh 
had presented evidence at trial that it was her “potential to become pregnant in 
the future that served as a catalyst for [her supervisor’s] discriminatory 
behavior”•including, among other evidence, testimony that when Ms. Walsh 
had fainted at work, her supervisor remarked, “You better not be pregnant 
again!”27 
1. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases 
Kocak and Walsh represent important precedent for victims of maternal wall 
discrimination because they bring maternal wall discrimination within the 
 
 19. Kocak, 400 F.3d at 468. 
 20. Id at 469. 
 21. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 22. Kocak, 400 F.3d at 469-70. 
 23. Id. at 470 n.2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 332 F.3d at 1160. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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purview of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  In so doing, these cases expand 
the class of women protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, thereby 
providing victims of maternal wall discrimination with an important avenue for 
recovery. 
The holding in Kocak and Walsh that women who experience discrimination 
based on future pregnancies may avail themselves of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act aligns the coverage afforded by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act with the findings of social science research documenting 
overwhelmingly negative stereotypes about the competence and commitment of 
pregnant women and mothers.  One study revealed that pregnant working 
women are associated with several negative stereotypes—that they are “overly 
emotional,” “irrational,” “moody,” “preoccupied,” “undependable,” and 
“physically limited.”28  Another study showed that pregnant women, as 
compared to nonpregnant women, are subjected to lower performance ratings 
based on identical behavior and other available information.29  Such ratings 
likely reflect the stereotypes that pregnant women will become less available 
and committed to their jobs and that they pose risks to their employer because 
they will likely not return to work at the conclusion of their maternity leave.30  
The stereotype that women who become pregnant will lose interest in their jobs, 
if taken to its logical extreme, may cause employers to be reluctant to hire 
women whom they fear might become pregnant.  As one dissenting opinion put 
it: 
If an employer is allowed to take action based solely on the stereotype that new 
mothers are unlikely to return to work, it requires only a small step for 
companies to avoid hiring women of childbearing age altogether out of a fear 
that the women will some day become pregnant, take a substantial amount of 
time off, and perhaps never want to return to work at all.31 
Accordingly, Kocak and Walsh hold the potential to protect nonmothers as well 
as mothers from maternal wall discrimination.  These cases also substantially 
enlarge the class of women who may bring claims pursuant to the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, since the class of women who may become pregnant in the 
future is plainly larger than the class of women who are pregnant at a particular 
moment in time.  Kocak and Walsh broaden the class of women viewed as 
“potentially pregnant” beyond the definition adopted in previous cases, notably 
Johnson Controls,32 where the “potentially pregnant” plaintiffs were undergoing 
 
 28. See Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance Appraisals, 14 J. ORG. 
BEHAV. 649,  652-655 (1993). 
 29. Id. at 653-55. 
 30. See id. at 655; see also Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Servs., 336 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 2003) (Evans, 
J., dissenting) (When Appellee told ARC’s hiring employee that she wanted the job, he replied, “We 
want to wait” because “we want to see how this pregnancy thing turns out. . . . I know how you 
women are.  Once you have that baby, you’re not going to want to return.”), vacated on other grounds, 
350 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 31. Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 619. 
 32. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
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fertility treatments at the time of the adverse employment action or had 
miscarried before such action was taken.33 
By contrast, Walsh endorsed plaintiff’s framing of her claim as 
discrimination based on the fact that she was “a woman who had been 
pregnant, had taken a maternity leave, and might become pregnant again,” 
suggesting that plaintiffs need not prove a strong certainty of future pregnancy 
to qualify for coverage under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.34  Kocak goes a 
step further by refraining from ruling on whether women who have never been 
pregnant can sue under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.35  In so doing, Kocak 
implies that any woman of childbearing age could meet the threshold inquiry in 
a Pregnancy Discrimination Act case of whether the plaintiff is a member of the 
protected class.36 
Walsh and Kocak also offer a new means of casting claims of plaintiffs who 
believe that their employers discriminated against them on the basis of being 
“new moms.”  Courts have been uniformly unreceptive to “new mom” claims 
brought under Title VII37 on the ground that “new moms” are not a protected 
class under Title VII and that an individual’s choice to care for a child is a “social 
role.”38  By permitting claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act based on 
past, present or future pregnancies, Walsh and Kocak bring some discrimination 
claims based on status as a “new mom” within the purview of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. 
 
 33. See, e.g., Newman, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *21 (plaintiff terminated after miscarriage); 
Cleese, 911 F. Supp. at 1315 (disparate treatment occurred while plaintiff was undergoing fertility 
treatment); Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1401-02 (same). 
 34. 332 F.3d at 1160. 
 35. See 400 F.3d at 470 n.2. 
 36. These cases diminish the persuasiveness of cases in which courts have held that plaintiffs 
must prove that they were pregnant at the time of or directly preceding the adverse employment 
practice.  See, e.g., Mullet v. Wayne-Dalton Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812-13 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (must 
show plaintiff was pregnant as part of prima facie case); Bergman v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., 344 F. 
Supp. 2d 998, 1001 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (same); Davis v. Emery Worldwide Corp., 267 F. Supp. 2d 109, 
119 (D. Me. 2003) (same); Green v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135 (D. Me. 
2002) (same); Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(same).  This line of cases directly contradicts the statutory language of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, which applies to “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which Congress did not limit to current or past pregnancies. 
 37. E.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 340-342 (8th Cir. 1997) (discrimination 
claim based on status as new parent not cognizable under Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Piraino v. 
Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (claim brought by mother with young 
children where the adverse action was not linked to her pregnancy would not be actionable under 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act). 
 38. See Piantanida, 116 F.3d at 340, 342 (“[A]n employers’ discrimination against an employee 
who has accepted this parental role . . . is . . . not based on the gender-specific biological functions of 
pregnancy and child-bearing, but rather is based on a gender neutral status potentially possessible 
by all employees, including men and women who will never be pregnant.”). 
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B. Part-Time and Full-Time Employees May Be Similarly Situated Under the 
Equal Pay Act and Title VII. 
1. Case law 
A district court in Virginia recently held that “the EPA [Equal Pay Act] . . . 
does not categorically preclude a part-time plaintiff from establishing a prima 
facie pay discrimination claim by designating a full-time comparator,”39 and 
applied the same reasoning to companion claims brought under Title VII. 
In Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia rejected defendant’s argument that Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
preclude comparisons of part-time and full-time workers.  Linda Lovell, who 
worked a reduced hour schedule of thirty hours per week, sought to compare 
herself to an employee who worked a forty-hour work week.40  The court 
explained that, “where the plaintiff’s actual tasks, duties, and responsibilities are 
essentially similar to those of the putative comparator,” the question whether a 
part-time employee could be compared to a full-time employee was one of fact 
for the jury to resolve.41  The court further opined that in determining whether 
two employees are comparable for purposes of the Equal Pay Act, the jury 
should focus on whether the full-time employee performs any additional tasks 
or job duties, rather than focusing on the number of hours worked.42  Based on 
this reasoning, the court also held that Ms. Lovell was not barred as a matter of 
law from asserting that a full-time employee was similarly situated pursuant to 
Title VII.43 
2. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases 
Lovell’s well-reasoned opinion expands the types of evidence that plaintiffs 
with part-time schedules may use to litigate claims under Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act when their employers refuse to provide them with equitable 
compensation, benefits, or opportunities for advancement.  Lovell also exposes 
the gender bias and faulty analysis that infect cases in which courts have held 
that part-time and full-time employees can never be compared. 
Several cases issued prior to Lovell, in which the courts rejected the 
attempts of part-time employees to compare themselves with full-time 
employees, reveal a bias against part-timers.44  For example, in Ilhardt v. Sara Lee 
 
 39. Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 40. Id. at 619, 625. 
 41. Id. at 619. 
 42. Id. at 620-21.  (“The key is therefore a difference in duties, not a difference in hours.”). 
 43. Id. at 624-25.  (“Because the standard of similarity under Title VII is less stringent than the 
standard under the EPA [Equal Pay Act], it necessarily follows that plaintiff also adduced sufficient 
trial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff and [a full-time employee] 
are similarly-situated employees under Title VII.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997); Stockhoff v. D.E. 
Baugh Co., IP 01-0566-C-B/S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3619, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2003) (full-time 
and part-time employees not similarly situated); Payne v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 273, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (part-time, temporary employee must compare herself with other 
part-time, temporary employees); Brown v. Super K-Mart, No. 98 C 3498, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525, 
at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1999) (full-time and part-time employees not similarly situated). 
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Corp., the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Lora Ilhardt, 
who worked a part-time schedule, could not properly be compared to a 
nonpregnant full-time employee on the ground that “full-time employees are 
simply not similarly situated to part-time employees.”45  In support of this 
circular reasoning, the court made the equally circular assertion that “[t]here are 
too many differences between them” such as the differences in hours worked 
and the pay and benefits received by part-time employees.46  The argument that 
it is legal to pay part-timers a lower wage rate than full-timers because of 
“differences in pay” hardly seems a tour de force of legal reasoning.  The court 
did not explore whether the job responsibilities of Ms. Ilhardt and her full-time 
peers were similar, nor did it cite any pertinent case law or statute in support of 
its argument.47  Ilhardt’s circular reasoning smacks of what Michelle Travis has 
termed “workplace essentialism,” that is, the assumption—without evidence—
that a job traditionally designed to require full-time work with very long hours 
or unlimited overtime cannot be redesigned on a flexible schedule.48  Given the 
extensive literature on job redesign and workplace flexibility,49 this seems an 
indefensible assumption. 
Moreover, unexamined assumptions that it is appropriate to deny part-
timers advancement and to pay them a lower wage rate are troubling in the face 
of social psychological studies documenting that part-time workers are 
stereotyped as more similar to homemakers than to women employed full-
time;50 that homemakers are stereotyped as extraordinarily low in competence 
(alongside the “elderly,” “blind,” “retarded,” and “disabled”);51 and that 
stereotypes of women occur at the sub-group level (“homemakers,” “babes,” 
“businesswomen,” etc.).52  This literature suggests the stigma associated with 
part-time work tracks documented patterns of gender stereotyping.53 
 
 45. 118 F.3d at 1155. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6-8 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential]. 
 49. See LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD 79-96 (1993); LOTTE BAILYN, ROBERT DRAGO & 
THOMAS A. KOCHAN, INTEGRATING WORK AND FAMILY LIFE: A HOLISTIC APPROACH (2001); Lotte 
Bailyn, Joyce K. Fletcher & Deborah Kolb, Unexpected Connections: Considering Employees’ Personal 
Lives can Revitalize Your Business, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 11, 11-19. 
 50. Cf. Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and 
What We Don’t Know, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3, 10 (1995) (observing that 
when a feature such as an individual’s sex is highlighted, distinctive or unique, it becomes salient 
and thus the “basis of categorization and sex stereotypes”). 
 51. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth 
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878 
(2002); see also Thomas Eckes, Paternalistic and Envious Gender Stereotypes: Testing Predictions from the 
Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEX ROLES 99, 110 (2002). 
 52. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as 
Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 113 (2001). 
 53. Part-time workers are viewed as more similar to homemakers than to women employed full 
time.  See Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and Beliefs About 
Part-Time Employees, 10 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 252, 254 (1986).  This phenomenon may explain why 
part-time workers are stigmatized and denied opportunities for advancement.  Williams, Beyond the 
Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 91. 
03_WILLIAMS_WESTFALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:54 AM 
 DECONSTRUCTING THE MATERNAL WALL 39 
Holding that part-timers cannot use full-timers as comparators, regardless 
of their “actual tasks, duties, and responsibilities,”54 significantly hampers, or 
precludes altogether, many women’s ability to prove claims under Title VII or 
the Equal Pay Act.  For example, if a female plaintiff who works part-time brings 
a Title VII or Equal Pay Act claim and seeks to prove her case circumstantially, 
she would be required under Ilhardt to produce comparative evidence of 
favorable treatment of male part-time workers. 55  In many (if not most) 
workplaces, including the workplace in Ilhardt,56 no such comparators exist 
because no males work part-time.  As a result, a plaintiff would have extreme 
difficulty proving her case with circumstantial evidence. 
The result is to create enormous loopholes in the Equal Pay Act and Title 
VII.  As the court in Lovell observed, if part-time workers who brought Equal 
Pay Act claims were prohibited as a matter of law from presenting comparative 
evidence of treatment of full-time workers, “such a rule would allow an 
employer to avoid the EPA’s [Equal Pay Act] strictures by simply employing 
women in jobs with slightly reduced-hour schedules and paying them at a lower 
rate than their male counterparts,” thereby “completely subvert[ing] the EPA’s 
purpose.”57 
By focusing on the actual distinctions between full and part-time workers’ 
“tasks, duties, and responsibilities,”58 rather than on their schedules, Lovell 
strikes a blow against workplace essentialism and expands opportunities for 
part-time workers to litigate inequitable compensation, benefits and 
opportunities for promotion under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 
C. Stereotyping of Women as Caregivers Can By Itself Be Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination. 
1. Case law 
In Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School District, the Second Circuit 
held that stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.59  The court also held that a 
plaintiff who brings this type of claim need not present evidence of how the 
employer in question treated fathers.60 
 
 54. Lovell, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 619, 625. 
 55. See Ilhardt, 118 F.3d.1151, 1155. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Lovell, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 58. Id. at 619, 625. 
 59. 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
731-32 n.5 (2003) (stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” is a 
“gender stereotype”); Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at 
*6 n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (following Back; holding that “where an employer’s objection to an 
employee’s parental duties is actually a veiled assertion that mothers, because they are women, are 
insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and motherhood are incompatible, such treatment is 
gender based and is properly addressed under Title VII.”). 
 60. Back, 365 F.3d at 113. 
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Elana Back was a school psychologist at Hillside Elementary School who 
received “excellent” evaluations during her first two years at the school.61  Ms. 
Back presented evidence that shortly after her return from maternity leave, as 
her tenure review was approaching, one of her supervisors, Ann Brennan, 
inquired about how Ms. Back was “planning on spacing [her] offspring;” asked 
that Ms. Back “not get pregnant until I retire;” and suggested that Ms. Back 
“wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child.”62 
Ms. Back also presented evidence that Ms. Brennan had repeatedly opined 
that Ms. Back’s job was “not for a mother.”63  She and another of Ms. Back’s 
supervisors, Marilyn Wishnie, expressed concern that because Ms. Back was a 
“young mother, [she] would not continue [her] commitment to the workplace.”64  
Additionally, Ms. Brennan and Ms. Wishnie stated that they “wanted another 
year to assess [Ms. Back’s] child care situation” before granting her tenure.65  
Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court granted Ms. Brennan and Ms. 
Wishnie’s motions for summary judgment.66 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that comments made about a 
woman’s inability to combine work and motherhood—in particular, that a 
woman cannot “be a good mother” and have a job that requires long hours or 
that a mother who received tenure “would not show the same level of 
commitment [she] had shown because [she] had little ones at home,” constituted 
direct evidence of sex discrimination under a stereotyping theory.67  The court 
further held that Ms. Back did not need to produce evidence about the school’s 
treatment of male administrators with young children in order for her sex 
discrimination claim to withstand a motion for summary judgment.68 
2. Implications for Litigation of Maternal Wall Cases 
Back represents an extraordinary development in the area of maternal wall 
jurisprudence.  It forthrightly acknowledges that the belief of many employers 
that mothers are insufficiently committed to their jobs and thus, cannot 
competently perform their job responsibilities, is a pernicious stereotype.69  It 
further holds that if a public employer takes adverse actions against a mother 
based on such stereotypes, the employer will have engaged in intentional 
gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.70  Finally, Back 
offers plaintiffs who bring discrimination cases under a stereotyping theory 
flexibility in the evidence they must produce to defeat a defendant’s summary 
judgment motion.71 
 
 61. Id. at 114. 
 62. Id. at 115. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 113. 
 67. Id. at 119-20. 
 68. Id. at 121. 
 69. Id. at 107. 
 70. Id. at 130. 
 71. Id. at 124. 
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First, the court recognizes that the Price Waterhouse stereotyping theory, 
allowing “stereotyped remarks” to be “evidence that gender played a part” in an 
adverse employment action,72 is available to plaintiffs who seek to support a 
claim of sex discrimination with evidence of maternal wall bias.73  This is 
significant because stereotypes that mothers are not committed or competent are 
remarkably prevalent in the workplace.74  Thus, statements evincing stereotypes 
about the competence and commitment of mothers may be evidence that is 
readily available to plaintiffs who assert that their employers have discriminated 
against them on the basis of their sex. 
Second, the particular stereotypes about mothers in the workplace that the 
court identified have been documented by social scientists.  The Back court 
suggested that a jury could conclude that comments that: (1) mothers are not 
committed to their jobs, cannot balance work and family life, or are less valuable 
employees due to family responsibilities; (2) mothers are happier at home with 
their children than performing market work; or (3) the family is the woman’s 
domain, reflect gender-based stereotypes and that a jury could properly rely 
upon such comments as evidence of unlawful gender animus.75  Social science 
research has demonstrated that stereotypes about mothers are commonplace.76 
Third, Back offers plaintiffs who bring cases pursuant to a Price Waterhouse 
stereotyping theory flexibility in proving intentional discrimination.  In 
particular, Back suggests that plaintiffs need not present expert testimony to 
support the assertion that certain comments reveal gender stereotyping.  The 
court held that the question of what constitutes a “gender-based stereotype” is a 
question that “must be answered in the particular context in which it arises and 
without undue formalization,” and that recognizing certain sex stereotypes 
“takes no special training.”77  Thus, plaintiffs may avoid expending resources on 
expert reports and testimony to explain such stereotypes.78 
 
 72. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 73. Back, 365 F.3d at 119.  In so holding, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the district court’s 
holding that “gender plus” claims are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and held that the term 
“sex plus” or “gender plus” is “simply a heuristic” and a “judicial convenience developed in the 
context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can, under certain circumstances, survive summary 
judgment even when not all members of a disfavored class are discriminated against.”  Id. at 118-19.  
The court further explained that “[t]he relevant issue is not whether a claim is characterized as ‘sex 
plus’ or ‘gender plus,’ but rather, whether the plaintiff provides evidence of purposefully sex-
discriminatory acts.”  Id. at 119.  Accordingly, plaintiffs whose employers took adverse actions 
against them based on maternal wall stereotyping need not necessarily assert a “sex plus” claim of 
gender discrimination.  Rather, maternal wall stereotyping may properly support a claim of garden 
variety sex discrimination. 
 74. One of the co-authors has observed that employers have “loose lips” when it comes to 
overtly discriminatory comments about mothers in the workplace.  Williams, Beyond the Maternal 
Wall, supra note 2, at 108. 
 75. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-21. 
 76. See Williams, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 90 (discussing social science research 
as to stereotypes concerning mothers in the workplace). 
 77. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-20. 
 78. Although submission of an expert report to explain the link between a particular comment 
and a gender-based stereotype may bolster a plaintiff’s legal claims, Back makes clear that such 
submissions are unnecessary in the Second Circuit as to the particular stereotypes identified in that 
decision.  See Back, 365 F.3d at 120. 
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Finally, Back makes clear that in proceeding under a Price Waterhouse 
stereotyping theory, a plaintiff is not obligated to present comparative evidence 
of similarly situated men.79  Therefore, if a plaintiff presents evidence that she 
was subjected to stereotyping that was linked to her employer’s taking adverse 
employment action against her, she need not present comparative evidence of 
what her employer said about fathers.80  Nevertheless, as Back makes clear, such 
evidence could only strengthen plaintiff’s claims.81 
III.  DEVELOPING FAVORABLE CASE LAW WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES AN ADVERSE 
ACTION AGAINST A PREGNANT EMPLOYEE DUE TO A TEMPORARY, PREGNANCY-
RELATED CONDITION 
During the past fifteen years, a body of unfavorable case law has developed 
in which courts have dismissed pregnancy discrimination cases in which the 
employer took adverse action against the plaintiff because she was temporarily 
unable to perform her job as a direct result of her pregnancy.  For example, 
courts have dismissed cases in which the plaintiff’s employment was terminated 
due to her absence from work caused by morning sickness.82  Other courts have 
dismissed claims brought by plaintiffs who became temporarily unable to lift 
heavy objects due to their pregnancy.83 
The thrust of the courts’ reasoning in these cases is that the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not require employers to provide so-called 
“preferential treatment” to pregnant employees.  Under this reasoning, if an 
employer has a policy that employees who are injured off the job are not entitled 
to light or modified duty assignments, a pregnant employee who could no 
longer perform heavy lifting, which was one of her job responsibilities, could be 
denied a light duty assignment and terminated for her inability to lift heavy 
 
 79. Back, 365 F.3d at 121. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for 
being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, 
unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.”); Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209 
F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] is not violated by an 
employer who fires a pregnant employee for excessive absences, unless the employer overlooks the 
comparable absences of non-pregnant employees.”); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 
738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer 
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work . . .”). 
 83. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The PDA 
does not require that employers give preferential treatment to pregnant employees.  Appellee was 
therefore free to provide an accommodation to employees injured on the job without extending this 
accommodation to pregnant employees.”) (citations omitted); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 
F.3d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he PDA does not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to 
grant preferential treatment to pregnant women.”); Daugherty v. Genesis Health Ventures of 
Salisbury, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (D. Md. 2004) (“[T]he rule seems to be that [pregnancy] 
cannot be singled out for less favorable treatment.”); Mullet, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 811, 811 n.7 (although 
“[e]mployers are not required to treat pregnant employees in any special way,” “an employer may 
choose to give preferential treatment to pregnant employees, without giving the same preferential 
treatment to other employees.”) (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 
(1987)). 
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objects, without violating the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Likewise, if an 
employer had a policy of terminating employees for excessive absenteeism, a 
pregnant employee whose morning sickness caused absences from work and 
who was fired as a result would not have a claim under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. 
This Part discusses the reasoning behind the unfavorable case law 
concerning absences from work or inability to engage in heavy lifting due to 
pregnancy and proposes litigation strategies for redeveloping the case law to 
increase the likelihood of favorable outcomes for plaintiffs.  In particular, this 
Part proposes legal strategies and discovery plans under which more favorable 
case law might develop, including modifications to the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework,84 under which courts analyze most Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act claims. 
A. Unfavorable Pregnancy Discrimination Act Decisions Related to Pregnancy 
Symptoms 
Courts have set forth several bases for rejecting the claims of plaintiffs who 
were terminated for pregnancy symptoms that resulted in absenteeism, 
tardiness or inability to lift heavy objects.  First, some courts have held that 
when plaintiffs seek to prove their Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim within 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, their inability to perform the 
required job functions, while concededly due to pregnancy, is fatal to proving a 
prima facie case of discrimination.85  In these cases, the courts did not even reach 
the issue of whether the employer’s conduct was a pretext for pregnancy 
discrimination. 
Second, courts have seized upon plaintiffs’ lack of comparative evidence 
that the employer granted more favorable treatment to nonpregnant employees 
who were tardy, absent from work, or unable to lift heavy objects.86  Courts have 
emphasized the need for comparative evidence by referencing the statutory text 
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act87 which states, in part, that “women 
 
 84. The Supreme Court has explained that “McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have 
‘established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof 
in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases.’  First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.”  Then, the burden shifts to defendant to produce “evidence that the plaintiff was 
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”  If defendant 
satisfies this burden, the plaintiff “must be afforded the ‘opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were 
a pretext for discrimination.’”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 
(2000) (citations omitted). 
 85. See, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312 (requiring plaintiff to show, among other things, that “she 
was qualified for the position or benefit sought” as part of her prima facie case); Urbana, 138 F.3d at 
206 (same); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37 (“[B]ecause of [Troupe’s] tardiness she could not show that she 
met the employer’s requirements for her job, and thus she could not raise an issue of pretext.”); 
Delcourt v. BL Dev. Corp., No. 2:97-CV-199-B-B, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18226, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 
30, 1998) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that she was qualified for the job in question); Morazan 
v. Stone, No. 3:94-CV-54-BR2, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 1997) (same). 
 86. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583; Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313; Troupe, 20 F.3d 
at 736. 
 87. See, e.g., Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1320; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312. 
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affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits 
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”88  Comparative evidence is necessary, courts 
have often held, to assess whether pregnant plaintiffs were treated “the same” 
as other workers. 
Finally, courts have vigorously insisted that the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act does not require so-called “preferential treatment”89 of pregnant women and 
have argued that the statute serves as a “shield against discrimination, not a 
sword in the hands of a pregnant employee.”90  Even in cases in which the courts 
have conceded that the actions at issue were taken because of plaintiff’s 
pregnancy, they have dismissed their claims on the ground that pregnant 
workers are not entitled to “preferential treatment.”91 
Remarkably, courts have affirmed the dismissal of Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act claims, while at the same time admitting that plaintiffs were 
terminated due to their pregnancy symptoms.  For example, in Dormeyer v. 
Comerica Bank-Illinois, the Seventh Circuit admitted that there was a relation 
between plaintiff’s absenteeism and her pregnancy, “insofar as some of the 
absences may have been due to morning sickness, which was, of course, a 
consequence of [plaintiff’s] pregnancy.”92  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., acknowledged that “[a]t least some of these occasions 
of [plaintiff’s] missed work were pregnancy related.”93 
While forthrightly acknowledging that the plaintiffs were fired due to their 
pregnancies, the courts have held that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does 
not prohibit all such seemingly discriminatory conduct.  Far from ensuring that 
 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  Cf. Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 618 (“When evaluating cases under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, we must determine whether an employer treated a pregnant 
employee as it would have treated a ‘similarly affected but nonpregnant employee[].’  But 
pregnancy is unique, often making that seemingly simple task a difficult one.”) (citation omitted). 
 89. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1322; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312; Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 (“Urbano’s claim 
is thus not a request for relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for preferential 
treatment . . . .”); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (Pregnancy Discrimination Act is not a “warrant for 
favoritism.”). 
 90. In re Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 91. See, e.g., Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583 (“[T]he [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] does not protect a 
pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to 
pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are 
overlooked.”); Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1322 (same); Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (“[A]n employer does not 
violate the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] when it offers modified duty solely to employees 
who are injured on the job and not to employees who suffer from a non-occupational injury.”); 
Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 (“Continental treated Urbano the same as it treats any other worker who 
suffered an injury off duty.”); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (The Pregnancy Discrimination Act “requires the 
employer to ignore an employee’s pregnancy, but . . . not her absence from work, unless the 
employer overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees, in which event it would 
not be ignoring pregnancy after all.”) (citations omitted). 
 92. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583.  Likewise, in Armindo, the Eleventh Circuit framed one of the 
issues before it as whether the employer as a matter of law violated the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act “to the extent that its decision to fire [plaintiff] was based upon absences and other missed work 
that were the result of her pregnancy.”  Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321. 
 93. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321. 
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pregnant women are not disadvantaged in the workplace due to their 
pregnancy, the Seventh Circuit in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,  
suggested that some degree of inequitable treatment between pregnant women 
and their nonpregnant husbands is par for the course and not prohibited by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  The court specifically held that the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not “require employers to . . . make it easier for 
pregnant women to work—to make it as easy, say as it is for their spouses to 
continue working during pregnancy.”94  In effect, Troupe and similar cases 
remove significant categories of pregnant women—that is, those whose 
pregnancies cause symptoms that interfere with their ability to perform their job 
functions—from the scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  In so doing, 
these cases preclude Pregnancy Discrimination Act protection for many women. 
B. Strategies for Providing Legal Relief to Women Penalized at Work Because 
of Pregnancy Symptoms 
Pregnant women whose employers have subjected them to less favorable 
terms and conditions, demoted them or terminated their employment on the 
basis of their pregnancy symptoms, and who defend their actions by arguing 
that they have subjected similarly situated nonpregnant employees to the same 
treatment, may wish to adopt the following arguments and discovery plan in 
support of their Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims. 
First, plaintiffs should conduct discovery designed to identify direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent, including but not limited to stereotypes 
related to the plaintiff’s status as a pregnant woman or mother.95  As discussed 
above,96 employers often make remarks that are based on stereotypes that 
mothers are not sufficiently committed to or competent at performing their 
jobs.97  Evidence of stereotyping may be sufficient, without additional proof, to 
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer acted with 
discriminatory intent.98 
Second, if direct evidence is unavailable, plaintiffs who seek to prove their 
cases circumstantially under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, 
should argue for a flexible, reasonable prima facie case that does not require the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that she is currently able to perform all job functions.  In 
cases in which a plaintiff asserts that her employer discriminated against her by 
terminating her employment while she was temporarily unable to perform one 
or more of her job responsibilities due to pregnancy, some courts have required 
 
 94. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (citations omitted). 
 95. For a detailed discussion of the content of stereotyping against mothers and pregnant 
women, see Williams, Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 2, at 90-101; see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731-
32 n.5 (stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace” is a “gender 
stereotype”); Venturelli, 336 F.3d at 619 (discussing stereotype that pregnant women will be 
unwilling to return to work after having a baby); Plaetzer, 2004 WL 2066770, at *6 n.3 (discussing 
stereotype “that mothers, because they are women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work 
and motherhood are incompatible.”). 
 96. See notes 28 through 31, supra, and accompanying text. 
 97. Back, 365 F.3d at 119-21. 
 98. Id. at 113. 
03_WILLIAMS_WESTFALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:54 AM 
46 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:31 2006 
plaintiffs who seek to prove their case circumstantially to show in their prima 
facie case that they were “qualified for the position that [they] lost.”99  
Imposition of this requirement results in narrowing the class protected by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, thereby removing from its scope pregnant 
employees whose pregnancy symptoms temporarily prevent them from 
performing one or more of their job functions. 
A more appropriate inquiry, adopted by some courts,100 is whether the 
plaintiff is qualified for the alternative job or modified job responsibilities that 
she has requested, and whether she was qualified for the job that she had 
previously held, and would again be so qualified once her pregnancy symptoms 
had passed.  This standard fulfills the purposes of both the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and the McDonnell Douglas test in winnowing out the most 
obviously non-meritorious claims, while providing plaintiffs a fair opportunity 
to prove their claims. 
It is settled law that the standard for proving a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas is intended to be lenient.101  There is no convincing rationale 
for imposing a more burdensome prima facie standard in pregnancy cases than 
in other types of discrimination cases.  Further, the courts have made clear that 
the McDonnell Douglas test should not be applied in an inflexible, mechanical 
manner.102  Yet with respect to plaintiffs who are temporarily unable to perform 
their job responsibilities due to pregnancy, requiring such plaintiffs to prove 
that they are able to perform all of their job responsibilities while pregnant 
places a high proportion of pregnant women at risk of losing their jobs due to 
the temporary physical burdens of pregnancy.  In effect, this requirement 
perpetuates the very discrimination the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was 
designed to prohibit.103 
While granting plaintiffs more flexibility in proving a prima facie case, this 
proposed standard also fulfills the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
by identifying cases that plainly should be dismissed because the plaintiff was 
incapable of performing her job, at least in part, for nonpregnancy related 
reasons.  For example, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were able to 
perform their jobs absent pregnancy, would result in dismissal at the prima facie 
 
 99. E.g., Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312. 
 100. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 
1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring that plaintiff show that she qualified for the modified-duty 
positions sought); Parker v. Albertson’s, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (D. Utah 2004) (same). 
 101. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (proof of prima facie case is 
not onerous); Pope v. ESA Servs., 406 F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Gillis v. Ga. Dep’t of 
Corr., 400 F.3d 883, 889 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court, 392 F.3d 
151, 167 (6th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 102. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[P]recise requirements of a prima 
facie case can vary depending on the context and were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or 
ritualistic.’”) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); Birch, 392 F.3d at 
165-66 (same); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 n.17 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (unlawful to discriminate in employment “because of or on the basis 
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”); Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 763 
(7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[a]n unlawful employment practice occurs whenever pregnancy is a 
motivating factor for an adverse employment decision”). 
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stage of cases such as Armindo, in which the plaintiff’s absences from work were 
both pregnancy and nonpregnancy related.104 
The proposed standard also furthers the purpose of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act by allowing the plaintiff to present evidence that the 
employer’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action is a 
pretext for discrimination.  “At the prima facie stage . . . a plaintiff is only 
required to raise an inference of discrimination, not dispel the non-
discriminatory reasons subsequently proffered by the defendant.”105  If a 
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed at the prima facie stage because she cannot 
demonstrate that she is able to perform all of her job functions, cases in which 
employers have acted with discriminatory intent in establishing policies that 
target pregnant women for adverse treatment would not be actionable under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act—contrary to the very purpose of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. 
Suppose, for example, upon receiving notice of an employee’s pregnancy, 
an employer adopts a policy of limiting assignments of light duty jobs to 
employees who are injured on the job.  Certainly the timing of such a policy 
change would be strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination against 
pregnant women.106  Nevertheless, under the prima facie test currently employed 
by some courts, a pregnant plaintiff who was physically unable to perform 
heavy lifting would be precluded from bringing a Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
claim, even if her employer had acted with discriminatory intent on the basis of 
plaintiffs’ pregnancy in establishing its light duty policy. 
Third, plaintiffs should thoroughly explore the employer’s treatment of 
nonpregnant employees whom the employer purports are similarly situated to 
the plaintiff.  In several Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases in which the court 
affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff had not presented 
comparative evidence of the employer’s treatment of nonpregnant employees.107  
If the plaintiff is unable to unearth differential application of the employer’s 
policy to pregnant and nonpregnant employees, the plaintiff should gather 
evidence that shows that the pregnant and nonpregnant employees whom the 
employer asserts it treated equally are not similarly situated.108  For example, if 
 
 104. Armindo, 209 F.3d at 1321. 
 105. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1193. 
 106. See Wills-Hingos v. Raymond Corp., 104 F. App’x 773, 775 (2d Cir. 2004) (evidence that 
employee had unblemished record and was terminated after the defendant learned of her pregnancy 
and that her termination occurred immediately after she returned to work after a brief absence due 
to pregnancy-related conditions supported verdict in employee’s favor); Canavan v. Rita Ann 
Distrib., No. Civ. CCB03-3466, 2005 WL 67077, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2005) (“Temporal proximity 
between a protected activity and an adverse employment action may support an inference of 
discrimination.”); Newman, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19040, at *19 (“A sudden change in attitude upon 
disclosure that the plaintiff is pregnant and/or is taking maternity leave may raise an inference of 
discrimination if the plaintiff can establish that the only intervening event was the disclosure.”). 
 107. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313; Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736 (“We do not 
know whether Lord & Taylor was less tolerant of Troupe’s tardiness than it would have been had 
the cause not been a medical condition related to pregnancy.  There is no evidence on this question, 
vital as it is.”). 
 108. Although it would appear that the condition of pregnancy itself should render nonpregnant 
employees who are temporarily unable to perform a job function and pregnant workers suffering 
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the employer argues that it fired both pregnant and nonpregnant workers for 
tardiness, the plaintiff should attempt to discover differences between the 
plaintiff and persons outside of the protected class, such as frequency or severity 
of the tardiness, performance problems of the nonpregnant employees that 
might explain their terminations, and differences in the job responsibilities of the 
nonpregnant employees that might make their physical presence in the office 
during fixed hours, but not the plaintiff’s, crucial to the firm’s operations. 
Finally, plaintiffs whose pregnancy symptoms render them temporarily 
unable to perform one or more of their job functions and who cannot produce 
comparative evidence that their employers treated nonpregnant employees 
more favorably, or distinguish those comparators, should argue that they are 
entitled to present other circumstantial evidence that their employer 
discriminated against them on the basis of their pregnancy or “related medical 
conditions.”109  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s first clause prohibits sex 
discrimination in employment “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . . ,” and its second clause requires 
that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt 
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work.”110  Because the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act’s second clause (the requirement that women be treated the 
same) does not limit the first clause (the basic antidiscrimination provision),111 
even if a plaintiff who is unable to show that her employer has violated the 
requirement that women be treated “the same,” should be permitted to present 
evidence that her employer has violated the basic antidiscrimination provision. 
Plaintiffs whose employers assert that they have complied with the 
requirement that women be treated “the same” should seek discovery of 
circumstantial evidence that their employers’ actions against them were 
motivated by discriminatory intent on the basis of their pregnancy.  For 
example, suppose the plaintiff is a lawyer whose employer ostensibly 
terminated her due to her tardiness that stemmed entirely from morning 
 
from the same dissimilarly situated, most courts have not seen it that way.  A notable exception is 
the dissenting opinion in In re Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., in which Judge McKee observed, “One can not 
avoid a claim of discrimination by treating persons who are not similarly situated the same . . .  The 
majority’s reasoning would allow an employer to terminate a female employee because she missed a 
crucial meeting with an important client if a male employee would be terminated, even if the female 
missed the meeting because she was in labor delivering a baby, or suffering from a pregnancy-
related condition.  Although it may not be fair to terminate the male, it would not be illegal.  It is 
illegal to terminate the female because of the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act].” 129 F.3d at 303. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 285; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry 
Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983) (“The meaning 
of the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the 
application of the general principle to women employees.”); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577 
(5th Cir. 2003); Aubrey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 123 (6th Cir. 1989); Mullet, 338 F. Supp. 2d 
at 812 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 937-40 (1985) (the second clause “supplements, without 
limiting, the statutory definition of ‘sex’ set forth in the PDA’s [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] first 
clause”). 
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sickness, and the employer defends its decision by asserting that it has a policy 
of terminating employees, nonpregnant and pregnant alike, for tardiness.  If the 
plaintiff is unable to discover direct evidence of discrimination, evidence of 
stereotyping, or evidence that the nonpregnant employees whom the employer 
argues it treated the same as plaintiff are distinguishable, the plaintiff should 
probe the genesis of the employer’s policy to determine whether the morning 
sickness-related tardiness of the plaintiff or another pregnant employee 
triggered the adoption of the policy;112 whether the alleged purpose of the policy 
is otherwise pretextual;113 what the history of the use of such policy is and to 
whom it has been applied; the job performance of all employees whom the 
employer asserts it terminated for absenteeism (that is, were the employees 
actually terminated for infractions other than absenteeism); the employer’s 
treatment of other pregnant employees; the representation of pregnant women, 
and women generally, in the employer’s workforce;114 and the employer’s 
policies with regard to pregnancy, maternity leave and work/life balance. 
The plaintiff should also seek to show that firing her for absenteeism was 
merely a pretext for pregnancy discrimination because the absenteeism did not 
hamper her ability to perform her job responsibilities.  She might show, for 
example, that given her ability to satisfy her billable hour requirements while 
working at home, her presence in the office was not a necessary component of 
her job.  Although some courts assume, without support, that presence in the 
office is necessary and that termination of absent employees is fully warranted 
and not actionable under Title VII,115 plaintiffs may be able to show that their 
presence in the office during particular hours was not in fact necessary to 
performance of their jobs.  Evidence that the plaintiff’s presence in the office was 
not necessary would represent circumstantial evidence of the employer’s 
discriminatory intent in firing her.116 
Thus, by presenting circumstantial evidence that the employer fired the 
plaintiff not because of her absenteeism, but because of her pregnancy, a 
“related medical condition” or because of employer-held stereotypes about 
 
 112. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d at 1195 n.7 (“An employer could adopt a 
policy . . . as a method of ensuring that it would be able to terminate pregnant women with work 
restrictions while, at the same time, ensuring that it could retain other temporarily-disabled 
employees.”). 
 113. See id. at 1197-98 (evidence that employer’s purported reason for the policy―reduction of its 
workers’ compensation costs―was unsupported by studies that showed, in part, that it was 
pretextual). 
 114. See Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (in 
pregnancy discrimination case, reasonable fact finder could infer that unlawful discrimination 
caused decreasing number of women in corporate department). 
 115. See Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583 (assuming that physical presence in the office is always a 
necessary requirement of a job); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39 (same); Rafeh v. Univ. Research Co., 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 396, 399 (D. Md. 2000) (“As a matter of law an employer may mandate that those in 
leadership positions come to the office to do their job.  On its face [this] is an entirely reasonable 
requirement and one dictated by principles of sound management.”). 
 116. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence 
is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it 
may be quite persuasive.”). 
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pregnant women, the plaintiff may be able to persuade a court to deny the 
employer’s summary judgment motion. 
IV.  DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION TO CHALLENGE PRACTICES THAT UNFAIRLY 
DISADVANTAGE CAREGIVERS  
Numerous commentators have argued that Title VII has little to offer in the 
way of restructuring the workplace or establishing new workplace norms.117  
These criticisms suggest that legislative reform, collective bargaining, public 
education, and collaboration with employers may be more fruitful in changing 
workplace norms than litigation under Title VII.  While these strategies may be 
productive and should be pursued, this Part argues that Title VII is not without 
potential to remove barriers to caretakers’ participation in the workforce and 
proposes litigation strategies designed to challenge the legality of widespread 
practices in the workplace—such as requirements that employees work fixed 
hours and conduct all work in the office—that unfairly disadvantage carers. 
In her recent article, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment 
Discrimination Law, Michelle Travis proposes revitalizing the use of disparate 
impact claims under Title VII to remove structural barriers faced by women 
with care-giving responsibilities and to deconstruct workplace norms that 
unfairly favor “ideal workers” who are able to provide a full-time uninterrupted 
stream of market work.118  Travis suggests that Title VII has “unrealized 
transformative potential” which could be used to distinguish “actual job tasks 
from malleable organizational norms” subject to disparate impact review.119  
Although the legislative history of Title VII and a handful of cases that Travis 
cites support this thesis, the dearth of pertinent case law120 and difficulty in 
proving that a given practice has a disparate impact on pregnant employees121 
suggest that the plaintiffs’ bar may be reluctant to consider adopting Travis’s 
strategy and bringing the types of litigation that Travis proposes. 
This Part proposes alternative ways in which litigants may creatively use 
disparate treatment claims under Title VII to bring about structural change in 
the workplace and identifies specific workplace settings and practices that 
would present situations ripe for legal challenge.  At first blush, disparate 
treatment claims do not appear to hold much promise for attacking workplace 
norms that favor ideal workers who do not have significant caretaking 
responsibilities.  At their core, disparate treatment claims focus on an 
 
 117. See Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential, supra note 48, at 7 n.15 (listing 
commentators). 
 118. See generally id.; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2, 24, 71 (2000). 
 119. Travis, Recapturing Transformative Potential, supra note 48, at 77. 
 120. See id. at 79-82 (citing five cases). 
 121. See, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1314 (“Establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination involves two steps.  First, the plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice 
that allegedly has a disproportionate impact.  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate causation by 
offering statistical evidence sufficient to show that the challenged practice has resulted in prohibited 
discrimination.  If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer can then respond with 
evidence that the challenged practice is both related to the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.”) (citations omitted). 
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employer’s treatment of an individual employee, not workplace policies or 
norms.  Nevertheless, where a plaintiff seeks to prove her case with 
circumstantial evidence, the concept of pretext in the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting paradigm—long familiar to courts and the employment bar—may 
provide a means for challenging workplace structures that unfairly 
disadvantage carers. 
Under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must 
show that the employer’s purported legitimate reason for its adverse action 
against the plaintiff is a pretext for discrimination.122  As the Supreme Court 
recently explained, “[t]he trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the 
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory 
purpose.”123  Evidence in support of pretext may “take a variety of forms,”124 
including facts that reveal “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons 
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of 
credence.”125  As a result, plaintiffs are permitted broad leeway in conducting 
discovery to prove pretext.126 
Proving that an employer’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for an 
adverse employment action is pretextual provides the plaintiff with an 
opportunity to expose the employer’s policy as false and illegitimate as applied 
to her and, by extension, other workers.  As discussed in Part IV, supra, many 
disparate treatment cases brought under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
hinge upon the employer’s assertion that it has a policy of terminating all 
employees, pregnant or not, for absenteeism or tardiness.  If the plaintiff’s job 
does not require her physical presence in the workplace (at all, or during 
particular hours),127 the plaintiff could seek to prove pretext by presenting 
evidence that the employer’s argument that she needed to be present in the 
 
 122. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 123. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. 
 124. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). 
 125. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see Abramson v. 
William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless 
Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 126. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. demonstrates the use of broad discovery concerning pretext 
and its potential to bring about favorable outcomes for plaintiffs who bring Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act claims.  In that case, the EEOC skillfully gathered evidence that exposed the 
irrationality of employer’s asserted rule that it denied modified-duty assignments to pregnant 
women because their temporary disabilities did not stem from on-the-job injuries.  Horizon/CMS 
Healthcare Corp, 220 F.3d at 1197.  The employer had argued that the purpose of this policy was to 
reduce workers’ compensation costs.  Id.  In demonstrating that the employer’s reason for 
terminating the pregnant employees was pretextual, the EEOC set forth evidence that the employer 
had never conducted a formalized study of the cost savings purportedly associated with 
maintaining its policy; the employer was unable to articulate the economic factors justifying the 
policy or to explain how the policy reduced workers’ compensation costs; and there was no shortage 
of modified duty positions available.  Id. at 1198.  This evidence, among other facts, led the Tenth 
Circuit to conclude that there was a genuine doubt about the employer’s motivation for making a 
distinction in the modified duty policy between employees injured on the job and those injured off 
the job.  Id. at 1200. 
 127. Many accounting, attorney, sales, management, and consulting jobs could fall into this 
category. 
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workplace during certain hours, was merely a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination. 
For example, in defending their decision to terminate the employment of a 
pregnant worker, some employers assert that they merely applied a reasonable 
workplace rule, such as terminating the employment of workers who are absent 
or tardy, to the plaintiff and that because they apply the rule to all employees, 
the decision to terminate the plaintiff could not have been infected with 
discriminatory animus.  Ideally, the employer will have mechanically applied its 
rule to the plaintiff without regard to her actual job responsibilities. 
Through discovery, the plaintiff could then explore (1) the 
inappropriateness of applying the rule to her job; (2) her ability to fulfill her job 
requirements without being physically present in the office; and (3) the impact 
of the rule on carers.  Such discovery would enable the plaintiff both to prove 
that the employer’s reason for firing her was pretextual, and to challenge the 
assumption of many courts and employers that all employees, regardless of 
their particular job responsibilities, must conduct their work in the office during 
particularized and unvarying business hours and that this requirement is a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory requirement. 
In so doing, the plaintiff would show the court that such rules are not 
necessary in successfully carrying out many jobs and that those employers who 
unfairly apply them to pregnant women who can successfully work from home 
or work different hours, will not be shielded from liability under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act.  This approach, if successful, could cause employers to 
review their absenteeism and tardiness policies to ensure that their application 
to pregnant employees would withstand an attack for being a pretext for 
discrimination.  Accordingly, these cases might undermine the workplace 
essentialism that disadvantages many carers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In increasing numbers, mothers who are subjected to maternal wall 
discrimination are seeking to vindicate their civil rights in the courts and 
administrative agencies.  Where employers have engaged in stereotyping of 
mothers, subjected part-time and full-time workers to differential terms or 
conditions, or taken adverse actions against women based on past, present or 
future pregnancies, the victims of such conduct may now cite favorable case law 
in support of their claims under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. 
Additionally, pregnant women whose employers take adverse action 
against them based on pregnancy symptoms that have rendered them 
temporarily unable to perform one or more of their job functions should not be 
foreclosed from seeking remedies under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  
Notwithstanding some courts’ obsession with comparing such employees to 
nonpregnant employees who are purportedly similarly situated, plaintiffs are 
not prevented from presenting evidence of stereotyping or circumstantial 
evidence that does not focus on comparators to prove their claims.  Finally, in 
seeking to challenge workplace norms that favor ideal workers, plaintiffs and 
their counsel should not overlook Title VII’s disparate treatment theory under 
which proof of pretext may be employed to show, quite persuasively, that 
certain workplace norms are not essential parts of a particular job. 
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At this juncture, discrimination against carers is often transparent, as 
employers are surprisingly open in expressing stereotypes about mothers prior 
to taking adverse action against them.  Because mothers and others carers have 
begun to challenge this form of gender discrimination in increasing numbers, 
often successfully, employers have a significant incentive to eliminate 
discrimination against adults with family responsibilities. 
